The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.
Introduction
Of eight thematic sections that constitute our Minerva project, the second, Iraq's WMD Procurement and Deployment, and third, The State and the Iraqi Military, include substantial elements that deal directly or indirectly with Iraq's chemical warfare (CW) program. Unlike previous publications that seek to address Iraq's acquisition and employment of chemical weapons, and there are many, this project takes advantage of the primary information sources available to James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) researchers at the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) to investigate and clarify Iraqi ideas, concepts, and understandings of the country's CW program, including the tactical and strategic applications of its creations against external and internal enemies. Thus, for example, based on taped meetings of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, Saddam Hussein, himself, will inform us about his views on the employment of chemical weapons and targets for chemical attacks and, when he chooses to do so, provide reasons for his views.
When we first started to work with the CRRC's Saddam Hussein Regime Collection, it contained about 850 Iraqi state records (over 31,000 pages), and included only documents dated prior to April 9, 2003 . This is a very small proportion of what is available, namely more than 600,000 original captured Iraqi documents and several thousand hours of audio tapes and video footage.
This report has two sections. The first section presents our Chemical Research Plan and explains its five objectives. The second discusses the mostly technical reasons why it so far has been problematic to carry out the Chemical Research Plan and presents approaches for overcoming these technical barriers. In addition, there are three annexes. Annex 1 contains an overview of the Iraqi Saddam Hussein (SH) Collection as of May, 2012. Annex 2 has five examples of new information derived from the still classified documents of the SH Collection. Annex 3 is a chronology of Iraq's chemical weapons production activities (1931 -1998) 
I. Chemical Research Plan and Its Objectives
The underlying assumption of our Chemical Research Plan is that the documents and audio tapes made available to us at the CRRC, augmented by information derived from interviews with Iraqi principals, contain the information needed to accomplish the Chemical Research Plan's five major components, which are as follows.
Learning Iraq's CW Doctrine
We define doctrine for Iraq's CW program as: "A general articulation of how a chemical weapons capability contributes to Iraq's military objectives at the tactical and strategic levels;
Iraq's CW doctrine may have included cautions and concerns about the use of chemical weapons." To date, we have seen no official Iraqi doctrine for its CW program. However, one official Iraqi source, Iraq's "Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure of May 1996" submitted to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), has provided the overriding objective of Iraq's CW program: "Chemical weapons were developed and produced to be used only in urgent cases against the enemy's deep penetration into the Iraqi borders." This objective undoubtedly is incomplete since, for example, it does not encompass use against internal enemies, and we know that Iraq made substantial use of chemical weapons against its Kurdish and Shi'a populations.
If an Iraq CW doctrine existed, and we believe it must have existed in some form, it means that the Iraqi intelligence services and or military had decided that, in the first instance, Iranian forces were vulnerable to chemical attacks (only Iranian forces were in a position to effect deep penetration into Iraq). Finding out how the Iraqi intelligence and/or military came to this conclusion, and was able to convince the higher civilian authorities of its correctness, is certainly part of the Chemical Research Plan.
It is important for us to learn Iraq's CW doctrine because it signifies the intent of the CW program and therefore lays the basis for all subsequent activities required to acquire and use chemical weapons. It could be that there was no formal "doctrine" when the Iraq military began to experiment with chemicals, but some sort of understanding must have developed among higher echelon decision-makers in the early 1980s about military requirements (why were chemical weapons required) and applications (what kind of weapons would fulfill the requirements). It is reasonable to assume that this understanding developed as the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War intensified, and developed still further as the doctrine came to encompass internal enemies. Since a doctrine is the basis for all activities related to the acquisition of chemical weapons, identifying that doctrine and observing its evolution is one of our a primary research goal.
In particular, the three elements that constitute the chemical weapons acquisition process and thus bear on required capabilities -human resources, equipment and supplies, and facilities -are targets of the Chemical Research Plan, as well as an understanding of how and why chemical weapons were used against external and internal enemies.
Learning about Iraq's Human Resources Dedicated to CW
In order to acquire an indigenous CW capability, Iraq would in the first instance require the scientific and technical expertise to research and develop (R&D) the four components that constitute chemical weapons -CW agents, formulations, munitions and storage tanks, and dispersal mechanisms. (The effective military application of chemical weapons is a different capability, which is discussed below.) Such expertise resides in chemical scientists, chemical and weapons engineers, and technicians that supported chemists and engineers. There is very little information in the literature about the Iraqi scientists and engineers who planned, developed, and operated Iraq's CW program. Even with complete access to UNSCOM, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), and Iraq Study Group (ISG) reports and inspectors, we have learned little in the unclassified environment about how the Iraqi government went about recruiting the chemical scientists and engineers it needed; nothing is known about its reward system for these experts; nor is anything know about what happened to these experts after the spring of 2001. For example, we know nothing about the ethos that combines the two elements of both fear and cooptation that is discussed in the CNS's first deliverable. It is reasonable to assume that chemical scientists and engineers were enticed (targhib) to work for the CW program, but the enticements are not known. Similarly, it could be that they were intimidated (tarhib) to perform this work, and if so, nothing is known about intimidation methods in these cases. As these two notions capture the means and methods by which Saddam Hussein assured the survival of his leadership from 1979 to 2003, it is important to determine how they worked in the chemical sciences and engineering dedicated to CW.
Equipment and Supplies Required to Operate a Substantial BW Program
Unlike the situation regarding Human Resources, there is much information about how Iraq went about procuring the equipment and supplies it needed in order to be able to research, develop, test, and manufacture CW agents. The elaborate, secret acquisition effort to purchase dual-use equipment and supplies from industries in industrialized countries, as well as some developing countries that possessed specialized skills such as India, has been revealed to a large extent, and its success has been well analyzed. We propose to spend relatively little effort in this area of investigation, focusing that effort, instead, to fill some gaps in our knowledge about Iraq's secret dealings with less well known suppliers located in, for example, Egypt, the USSR, North Korea, China, and other as yet unknown entities. Further to this effort, it may be possible to find out whether Iraq helped Syria acquire a CW capability and/or chemical weapons.
Facilities Required to House or Hide Components of the CW Program
Similar to Equipment and Supplies, there is much open information about Iraq's CW facilities, including their locations, manufacturing methods, products, the quantity of products manufactured, deliveries of products to the military, and their usage against external and internal enemies. Therefore, we envision spending little effort on investigating CW-related facilities except, perhaps, those that were established by internal non-governmental organizations and industries operating at the edge of lawlessness after Saddam's government collapsed.
Use of Chemical Weapons
Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran and its own Kurdish and Shi'a populations. There are hundreds of publications that deal with both CW during the Iran-Iraq War and chemical terrorism against the Kurds and, to a lesser extent Shi'as, so it is not necessary for us to either review or repeat that history. Rather, the questions we will seek to answer are: What can we gain from having access to information in the CRRC records and tapes that casts new light on the Iran-Iraq War and the conflicts with Kurds and Shi'as, and/or provides new information on decision-making within the Saddam regime on chemical matters and uses? However, since the intentions for the use of chemical weapons had two different aspects -the first dealing with classical military usage, while the second is usage for state terrorism against Iraqis -they are dealt with separately.
i. Chemical weapons against Iran
The Chemical Research Plan envisions that we spend much of our effort on finding information in the documents and audio recordings that cast more light than is now available on the nature of civil-military relations during the Saddam era, the activities of various units within the Iraqi military that deployed and used chemical weapons, including how the performance of Iranian units was affected by chemical weapons used against them by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. The most important information we would be seeking is in regard to how the command structure functioned with respect to chemical weapons usage in the field. Though it is well known that Saddam himself, made both tactical and strategic decisions on chemical weapons usage by even the smallest military unit, we do not know to what extent he asked for and was given advice on technical matters, such as field conditions, meteorological conditions, enemy chemical defenses, and alternative approaches to achieving especially important tactical objectives. In general, it is not know why Saddam chose to become so intimately involved with tactical decision-making, so perhaps captured documents and audio recordings will provide more than clues on this matter.
On a related matter, little is known about the performance of Iraqi troops that were targets of Iranian chemical weapons in the latter part of the Iran-Iraq War, including how Iraqi troops defended themselves against Iranian chemical weapons. This being so, we expect to look for information that informs us about, among other issues, the training Iraqi soldiers received on protection against chemical weapons, including detectors and other warning systems, personal protective gear (e.g., masks), medical countermeasures, decontamination, and performance when subjected to CW.
ii. Chemical weapons against internal enemies
There was wide-spread, horrific use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi military against the Kurdish population and, perhaps, Shi'a Arabs populating the swamps and other territories in southern Iraq. Although it is widely hypothesized that Saddam ordered the use of chemical weapons against perceived internal enemies to either terrorize or punish them for subversive activities, such as seeking independence, collaborating with Iran, trying to overthrow the Saddam regime, or other anti-government actions, the decision-making process that resulted in the internal use of chemical weapons is not known. The Chemical Research Plan envisions that we spend a moderate amount of effort on uncovering information that will provide us with the ability to undertake in depth analysis of Iraqi use of chemical weapons, including determining how and on what basis decisions to do so were made, how chemical agents were selected, the limitations, if any, on their use, the rewards given to those who were especially ardent users of chemical weapons (we already know that a special reward system existed but do not know on what basis rewards were made), and whether chemical weapons usage was successful from the viewpoint of Saddam Hussein.
II. Technical Barriers to the Carrying Out of the Chemical Research Plan and Possible Means for Overcoming Them
The major barrier that has prevented us from carrying the Chemical Research Plan forward more rapidly has been the unavailability of relevant documents and audio recordings at the CRRC. There are two interconnected reasons for this situation. First, to date documents and recordings have been translated from Arabic to English and then reviewed by CRRC staff to redact sensitive technical and personal data at a rather slow pace. Thus by May 2012, only about 850 documents containing more than 31,000 pages were available to us for data mining, a small fraction of the overall source documents in the CRRC collection. (See Annex 1). A considerably larger number have been translated, but have not undergone sensitivity review.
Second, of the documents and recordings that have been translated and vetted for sensitivity, only a small proportion addresses CW-related subjects and issues. When these few thousand sources are data mined using the search terms we have developed, only a comparatively small number of hits was recorded. For example, when using the very general search term "chemical," only 261 hits were recorded. However, by far most of these hits were documents that dealt with Iraqi government relations with UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, which are not of direct interest to our Chemical Research Plan. Thus, of the 261, only 16 hits were relevant to the Chemical Research Plan because they were related to the more specific search term "chemical weapon."
A similar situation exists regarding audio recordings. Some audio recordings have been transcribed and translated by the CRRC previous to our data mining attempts and have been put to good use by three editors who collated and annotated them in a book. 1 A few of these provide information that is important to both our biological and chemical weapon research plans. For example, one recording contains a discussion between Saddam Hussein and several high ranking generals about targeting Iraq's biological and chemical weapons on sites and population centers in Saudi Arabia, Israel, and elsewhere. This information is entirely new. From the small sample of transcribed recordings reproduced in the Woods et al. book, it is reasonable to believe that a substantial trove of policy-related discussion bearing on Iraq's BW and CW programs, the use of biological and chemical weapons, and their ultimate disposition will be found in the not as yet translated or in translated but not yet released audio recordings.
III. Overcoming Technical Barriers to Implementing the Chemical Research Plan
Having described the barriers to our work, we next present ideas on how to overcome them. In the main, we propose two approaches: (1) assisting CRRC in directing future translation efforts so that they target documents that were issued by Iraqi agencies that were most heavily involved with CW issues, and (2) assisting CRRC in identifying translated Iraqi documents that should be targeted for earliest declassification so that we can use them for the research and analysis we conduct for our Minerva project.
The first approach should, with the help of CRRC's staff members, be relatively easily accomplished. From our research efforts to date, it appears that most of the documents that bear on CW issues were written by persons who worked for the following agencies (see Annex 1), which are listed here in order of importance to us: the Military Industrial Commission (MICN), 2 the Ministry of Defense (MODX), the General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID), the Armed Forces General Command (AFGC), the Army (IZAR), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA). Thus we encourage the CRRC to focus its translation efforts on documents issued by these agencies.
The second approach is one that further narrows the focus of the first approach. One of the CNS research staff, Dr. Raymond Zilinskas, had a Secret clearance with the NDU until July 27, 2012. This clearance was transferred to the CRRC in April 2012, which allowed him access to all the captured Iraqi documents in the CRRC's collection that are classified. However, since Zilinskas does not speak Arabic, de facto he had access to only the documents that had been translated but were awaiting sensitivity review before being released. Nevertheless, in May 2012, when Zilinskas spent four days at the CRRC, he observed that approximately 300,000 documents had been translated. Recall that in March 2012 (see above), Zilinskas had searched the 850 documents that were cleared for general release and had come up with 261 hits on the term "chemical" and 16 hits on the term "chemical weapon." However, in May when he data mined the much larger number of classified documents, his results were astounding: over 16,000 hits on "chemical" and over 9,000 hits on "chemical weapon."
In order for a document to be useful for the CNS research effort, it has to be cleared for general release by an appropriate agency, which at this time appears to be National Defense University's (NDU's) Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSWMD). Clearing a document for general release involves having an expert on chemical warfare and weapons read a document and ascertain that it does not contain information that if released, might harm U.S. security or be hazardous to any person or persons. The rule is based on the appreciation that when dealing with captured Iraqi documents, two kinds of information should not be released. First, information that describes methods that an entity could use to develop chemical weapons or improve on existing chemical weapons must remain classified. Second, the names of private persons and companies that worked for the Iraqi CW program, supplied equipment and supplies to it, used chemical weapons, or provided information about CW-related activities to the United States or its allies should not be publicized, because these individuals might be targeted for retribution, kidnapping, or otherwise face hazards. (If documents were found that revealed criminal activity by individuals, those, presumably, would be turned over to proper authorities.)
With its limited human resources, it would unreasonable for us to request the CSWMD to clear the 9,000 documents that might contain information of interest to us. In other words, we would need to prioritize; i.e., identify the documents that would be highly likely to lead us to being able to achieve the objectives of our Chemical Research Plan and request that these be declassified with all possible haste. Accordingly, the second approach necessitates that Dr. Zilinskas review the approximately 9,000 documents for the purpose of identifying those that contain the information we need. Dr. Zilinskas started doing so during his stay at the CRRC in May 2012 and was able to identify about 400 documents that appeared, after his very quick review performed over a twoday period, to contain information of interest. Of these, he reviewed approximately 30 documents more intensively and noted information of definite interest. We provide examples of this information in Annex 2.
For technical reasons, involving the end of Dr. Zilinskas's consulting arrangement with the Department of State, his Secret clearance was terminated on July 27, 2012. In order to continue working the second approach -review of classified documents to accelerate sensitivity reviews and release -we will request the Army Research Office to take the necessary steps to secure a Secret clearance for Dr. Zilinskas as soon as possible.
Once the clearance has been secured, Dr. Zilinskas will spend substantial time at the CRRC to review the as yet classified translated Iraqi documents and audio files using the specific search terms that we have developed for the Chemical Research Plan. We are certain that by following this approach, and as demonstrated by the information in Annex 2, a substantial amount of new information will be collected that will enable us to fulfil the Chemical Research Plan.
It bears noting that CNS research staff has discussed another activity with CRRC that would be an off-shoot of the second approach. It would involve Dr. Zilinskas writing a research paper to fulfil the Chemical Research Plan using information taken from still classified documents. The research paper would perforce be classified, but would be submitted to the CSWMD for review and, if it agreed, to declassification. Since this paper would be mainly policy-related, it probably would not raise concerns about revealing methods or names. September 18, 1985 , that contains an assessment performed by Rihab Rashid Taha, Nasir Husayn Al-Hindawi, and Kamil Muhammed Abd-al-Majid. The three signatories were the top Iraqi biological warfare (BW) scientists, whose names have been widely publicized in previously released official documents and published research.
The assessment was done to determine the requirements for the mass production of biological agents A (code-letter for botulinum toxin) and B (code-letter for Bacillus anthracis) at the Department of Criminal Research/Biological Research. The authors note that the current biological production of these agents is a mere 30 liters every 5 days. To scale up to mass production, the authors estimate that three 5,000 liter fermenters will be needed; two for the production of A and one for B, as well as necessary attachments. However, the authors also noted that MICN experts have examined the fermenter situation and found that only the fermenter body, which constitutes only 10% of a fermenter, could be manufactured in Iraq, so 90% of the parts that constitute a fermenter would have to be purchased from foreign suppliers such as a named firm in Switzerland and a second named firm in Czechoslovakia. The letter has four sections. The first asserts that the "Zionist regime," the usual term for Israel that is found in Iraqi official correspondence, has chemical and biological weapons of various types in large quantities, which pose a threat to Iraq. In view of this threat, the letter continues, it is necessary for Iraq to learn more about Israel's biological and chemical weapons program so that Iraq can improve the training of Iraqi troops and take the necessary measures to protect civilians.
The second section explains the need of Iraq to identify domestic military and civilian targets that are vital to the country and prioritize them according to their importance. After this has been done, the letter states, methods need to be worked out to protect targets, so as to guarantee that the targets are invulnerable to chemical or biological attack.
The third section deals with methods needed to meet the threat from Israeli CW to Iraq's population by means of civil defense.
The fourth section asserts that the most effective defense against Israeli chemical and biological weapons is "deterrence." To achieve effective deterrence, the letter then lists four specific steps Iraq needs to take. Example 3 is a Top Secret "Annual Report: Meeting Minutes Correspondence Pertaining to the Technical Researches Center in Regards to Each Working Section," dated October 16, 1990 . This report is highly technical and rather long (49 pages), so only a few parts of it that deal with heretofore unknown details of the Technical Research Center (TRC), which developed both chemical and biological weapons, are described here. The report is signed by high officials, including Imad Muhammad Dhiyab (director of TRC), Rihab Rashid Taha (BW scientist at TRC), and Muhammad Faraj Bilal (director of the Al-Muthanna General Establishment). 3 The annual meeting that this report discusses spent much time on establishing specifications for chemical and biological "substances," the types of munitions that would be used to disperse them, various formulations of the chemical and biological agents, fatal doses for each, and arrangements for storing loaded munitions to reduce the deterioration of their contents.
An addendum to the annual report, dated October 24, 1990 , discusses open air experiments to confirm fatal doses. The documents go into considerable detail on these matters. Most of the CW plants and facilities at Samarra are operational.
1983
Mustard was being produced on a large scale at the P-8 Plant (Bin Hayan Plant after 1987) from 1983 to 1988 and from 1990 until January 1991. Its maximum production capability was 8 tons of mustard daily. Estimated total production for the year was150 tons.
Biological weapons development added to Project 922. 1983 First use of mustard against Iranian troops is reported in the news media.
There was twin so-called Multipurpose Precursor Plants named Ahmed 1 and Ahmed 2 (combined as Mutassim 2 after 1987). They produced precursors for tabun and sarin, including D4, MPC, MPF, and DMMP at a maximum rate of two tons per day during 1983-1987. 1983 Three identical pilot production plants were designed to help in the development of processes to produce indigenous precursors for tabun and sarin production. 1985 In addition to developing the Samarra site, SEPP founded three additional facilities called Fallujah 1, 2, and 3. These identical facilities were located about 20 kilometers north of Fallujah city and were designated as "multipurpose plants," which meant that they could produce raw materials and precursors for the manufacture of CW agents chemical weapons when necessary, but also chemicals for peaceful industrial purposes such as pesticides.
1986
An aerial bomb production workshop called "Nasser Factory" was built by SEPP on the Samarra site and became operational in 1986. It was designed to manufacture low drag, general purpose bombs that could be easily modified for filling with CW agents. 1986
The so-called Malik Multipurpose Plant (Bin Hayan 2 after 1987) was built to produce sarin precursors. However, when it became operational in 1986, it was ordered to produce tabun. In 1987, it began to produce precursors for sarin, including DMMP and MPC, as well as the VX precursors diisopropylaminoethanol and MPS. In 1988, an attempt to produce VX at this plant failed.
Iraq stops production of tabun in favor of increasing its efforts to produce sarin and cyclosarin. 1987
In 1987, SEPP was renamed the Muthanna State Establishment (MSE) and placed under the authority of the newly established Military Industrialization Commission (MIC). 1987
Iraq declared that a short project was carried out at an unspecified site to produce distilled Lewisite. No stockpiles of this agent has been found, nor anything more than small quantities of its precursors.
